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TURNING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ON ITS




A fundamental principle of federal judicial review is that courts should
avoid deciding cases on constitutional grounds when a non-constitutional
basis for decision is available) In Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc. v. Prince
George's County,' the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit invoked this venerable principle - commonly referred to as the
"avoidance doctrine"3 - to hold that the district court committed
reversible error when it resolved the plaintiff's federal statutory
preemption challenge to a local telecommunications ordinance before it
addressed the plaintiff's alternative state law claims.4
The Fourth Circuit's spare, three-page opinion in Bell Atlantic
Maryland belies the complexity of the issues raised by its decision and
masks a basic error in the court's reasoning that led it to the wrong
outcome. Specifically, the court's assumption that the avoidance
*J.D., Georgetown University, 1997; M.Ed., Vanderbilt University, 1992;
A.B., Princeton University, 1990. Mr. Warshawsky is an associate with the
law firm of Covington & Burling in Washington, D.C., where he practices
employment law and general civil and appellate litigation. During the 1998-
99 term, he served as law clerk to United States District Judge Catherine C.
Blake, and assisted in the preparation of the district court's opinion in Bell
Atlantic Maryland. Judge Blake played no part in the genesis or preparation
of this article. Mr. Warshawsky would like to thank Robert A. Long, Jr., a
partner at Covington & Burling, for graciously agreeing to review an earlier
draft of this paper.
1. See, e.g., Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) ("If
there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional
adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality.., unless
such adjudication is unavoidable.").
2. 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000).
3. See, e.g., Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L.
REV. 1003, 1004 (1994). Another term used to describe this principle is the "last resort
rule." Id.
4. 212 F.3d at 865-66.
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doctrine applies to federal preemption claims is incorrect. The avoidance
doctrine only applies to constitutional decision-making, not statute-based
rulings. In making this assumption, the Fourth Circuit relied on
inapposite case law and completely ignored well-established Supreme
Court precedent to the contrary. The Fourth Circuit also appears to
have been motivated by strong anti-nationalist impulses. By requiring
district courts to exhaust all possible state law grounds for a decision
before addressing any federal preemption claims, the court's ruling
effectively inverts the supremacy of federal over state law. Under the
Fourth Circuit's approach, implementing Congress' express statutory
commands becomes secondary to deciding cases on state law grounds.
This article closely examines the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bell
Atlantic Maryland and explains why the court's reasoning is fatally
flawed. Part II sets out the basic facts, issues, and holdings of the case.
Part III demonstrates that the Fourth Circuit's application of the
avoidance doctrine to the plaintiff's federal preemption claim is not
supported by the cases cited in the court's opinion and is contrary to
Supreme Court precedent directly on point. Part IV discusses how the
Fourth Circuit's decision not only misapplies the avoidance doctrine, but
completely misconstrues the nature of the Supremacy Clause. Part V
concludes with a brief summary of the main points.
II. THE BELL ATLANTIC MARYLAND CASE
In October 1998, Prince George's County, Maryland5 enacted its first
comprehensive telecommunications law.6 The law established a complex
regulatory scheme governing the use of public rights-of-way by
telecommunications companies doing business in the County The law
applied to telephone service companies, cable television providers,
Internet access providers, and all other businesses whose "cables and
wires cross public land."" County Executive Wayne K. Curry explained
5. Prince George's County (P.G. County) is the second most populous county in
Maryland (after Montgomery County) and is situated due east of Washington, D.C. See
Maryland Electronic Capital: Maryland Counties, available at
http://www.state.md.us/meccount.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2001).
6. Prince George's County ordinance CB-98-1998, entitled "An Act concerning
Telecommunications Franchises for the Use of Public Property and Public Rights-of-way
in the County" (Telecommunications Franchise Law) (cited in Bell Atd. Maryland v.
Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (D. Md. 1999), vacated, 212 F.3d 863 (4th
Cir. 2000)). See generally Juan Otero, Ruling Overturned on Cable, Wire Fees, NATION'S
CITIES WEEKLY, May 22, 2000, at 8; Gerald Mizejewski, PG Panel Approves Telecom Fee,
8-1, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at B8.
7. Bell At. Maryland, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 808.
8. See Jackie Spinner, Pr. George's Loses Lawsuit on Phone Fee, WASH. POST, June
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the rationale for the law thusly: "Every time [a telecommunications
company] lays new wire, there is damage to public roads and property...
[a]s more and more people want to cut, the useful life of the road
reduces. Taxpayers have the right to expect that private companies will
pay for their use of this valuable asset."9
P.G. County's telecommunications law, "the first of its kind in the
region,"' required any telecommunications company desiring to
"construct, operate, replace, reconstruct or maintain a
telecommunications system on, over, or under any public rights-of-way"
to obtain a special license, called a "franchise," from the County." The
first step in obtaining a franchise was to submit a "lengthy and detailed
application form, along with a $5,000 application fee.' 2 The application
form required specific information about the applicant's proposed
telecommunications system and construction plans, as well as general
information about the applicant's finances and business operations
outside the County. 3 The application was then subjected to a multi-
layered review process, at each stage in which the County "exercise[d]
complete discretion over whether to grant or deny" the franchise."
The final step in the application process was entering into a "franchise
agreement" with the County Executive. 5 The franchise agreement set
forth the terms and conditions of the applicant's authorization (i.e., its
"franchise") to use the County's rights-of-way. 6  The terms and
conditions of a telecommunications company's franchise included, inter
alia, various record keeping and reporting requirements, the provision of
17, 1999, at B1.
9. Emily Bazelon, Curry Seeking to Tax Telecommunications, WASH. POST, June 23,
1998, at D3.
Prior to the passage of the Telecommunications Franchise Law, companies
wishing to install cable and other facilities on P.G. County's public rights-of-way had to
obtain construction permits from the Public Works Department pursuant to the County's
"Roads and Sidewalks" ordinance. See Bell At. Maryland, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 816 n.25; see
also Jackie Spinner, County Mulls Appeal of Ruling on Phone Fee; Officials Seek to Keep
Regulating Companies, WASH. POST, June 23, 1999, at M3. Since many of the regulatory
functions served by the franchise law were already provided for under the "Roads and
Sidewalks" ordinance, the franchise law faced opposition as a hidden tax measure from
some business and consumer interests. See Mizejewski, supra note 6, at B8-B9.
10. Spinner, supra note 9, at B5.
11. Bell AtL Maryland, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 808 (quoting Telecommunications Franchise
Law § 5A-151(a)).
12. Id. at 814.
13. Id. at 808.
14. Id. at 808-09, 814.
15. Id. at 809.
16. Id.
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free telecommunications services to the County, a prohibition on
corporate control transactions without the County's prior approval, and
payment of a three percent "right-of-way charge" levied on the
franchisee's annual gross revenues. 7 Failure to obtain a franchise or to
abide by the terms and conditions of a franchise agreement subjected a
telecommunications company to the immediate revocation of its existing
County-issued licenses and permits and authorized the County to order
the company to remove all of the company's lines and facilities from
public property within sixty days."'
Less than two months after the Telecommunications Franchise Law
was enacted, Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc., filed suit in federal district
court in Baltimore seeking to enjoin the law's enforcement.' 9 Bell
Atlantic was the incumbent local exchange carrier for P.G. County, and
its extensive network of telephone lines and related facilities on the
County's public rights-of-way was subject to the law's requirements.0 In
its complaint, Bell Atlantic contended that the law violated numerous
provisions of federal and state law, including the Commerce, Contract,
and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution," the Federal
Communications Act of 1934,22 the Federal Telecommunications Act of
1996,23 the Maryland Declaration of Rights,24 the Maryland Public
Utilities Companies Article,25 and Maryland common law.26 The district
court denied Bell Atlantic's motion for a preliminary injunction as moot
17. Id. at 810-11.
18. Id. at 808, 811.
19. Id. at 811-12. AT&T Communications, Inc., and Sprint Communications Co. filed
similar lawsuits shortly thereafter. See id. at 812 n.21. Both companies participated as
amici curiae in Bell Atlantic's lawsuit. Id.
Bell Atlantic opposed the law from its inception, maintaining in particular that
the County lacked "the legal or constitutional authority to impose [the three percent right-
of-way charge] .... " Bazelon, supra note 9 (quoting John W. Dillon, Bell Atlantic's Vice-
President of External Affairs). Bell Atlantic publicly claimed that it was "more than
happy to reimburse" the County for costs associated with the installation of
telecommunications equipment on public property, but objected that the franchise law was
intended "to generate revenue as opposed to ... recoup the costs." Spinner, supra note 9,
at B5.
20. Bell Atl. Maryland, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 807.
21. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1,
respectively.
22. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-159 (1994).
23. 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-276 (Supp. 1It 1994).
24. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights.
25. MD. CODE ANN., Public Utility Companies (1998).
26. Bell AtI. Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 812 (D.
Md. 1999) (alleging breach of contract), vacated 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000).
[Vol. 51:191
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after the parties agreed to maintain the status quo ante pending the
outcome of the litigation.27
Following extensive briefing and a full hearing on the merits, the
district court issued a decision striking down the franchise law and
permanently enjoining its enforcement. 8  In reaching its decision, the
district court expressly declined to address Bell Atlantic's constitutional
claims, "[i]n keeping with the court's 'duty to avoid deciding
constitutional questions presented unless essential to a proper disposition
of a case."' 29 Instead, the court rested its decision on federal preemption
grounds, finding that P.G. County's franchise law was preempted by the
Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("FTA" or "Act").3"
The FTA, which at the time was described as "the largest overhaul of
telecommunications laws in 62 years,"'" was enacted "to provide for a
pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to
accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced
telecommunications and information technologies and services to all
Americans by opening all telecommunications markets to competition.
32
Congress intended for market competition, not state or local regulation,
to decide which companies would provide the telecommunications
services demanded by consumers.33 Thus, section 253(a) of the Act,
27. Id. The preliminary injunction hearing was held before Chief Judge Frederick J.
Motz. Id. The case thereafter was reassigned to Judge Catherine C. Blake. Id. at 812 &
n.20.
28. Id. at 822.
29. Id. at 813 (quoting Harmon v. Brucker, 355 U.S. 579, 581 (1958) (per curiam)).
30. Id. at 813, 820. The federal preemption doctrine generally provides that all state
and local laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to" federal law are invalid. See, e.g.,
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (citation
omitted). Originally articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in the seminal cases of
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819), and Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824), the
doctrine is rooted in the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, which declares that "the Laws
of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2; see generally Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for
Congress or the Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1995) (discussing the federal preemption
doctrine); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767
(1994) (same).
31. Mike Mills, Telecommunications Bill Passed; Clinton to Sign Measure that Would
Have Wide Impact on Consumers, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1996, at Al.
32. S. Conf. Rep. No. 104-230, at 1 (1996).
33. Bell Atl. Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 813 (D.
Md. 1999) (citing In re Classic Tel., Inc., 11 F.C.C.R. 13082, 25 (F.C.C. 1996)); see also
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 368 (1999) (explaining that the FTA
"fundamentally restructures local telephone markets" and that "[sitates may no longer
enforce laws that impede competition"); AT&T Communications, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8
F. Supp. 2d 582, 585 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (explaining that the FTA was passed "to end the
2001]
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entitled "Removal of barriers to entry," expressly provides that "[n]o
State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service. 3 4 The only exceptions to the Act's strict preemption rule are (1)
state laws designed to preserve universal telephone service and protect
consumer rights and public safety,35 and (2) state and local laws designed
"to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and reasonable
compensation from telecommunications providers ... for use of public
rights-of-way. ,36
The two issues before the district court in Bell Atlantic Maryland were
whether P.G. County's franchise law ran afoul of the FTA's sweeping
preemption provision and, if so, whether it was saved by either of the
Act's two "safe harbor" provisions." The district court answered the first
question in the affirmative, finding that the law's numerous application,
approval, reporting, fee, and oversight requirements "create a substantial
and unlawful barrier to entry into the Prince George's County
telecommunications market."39  The court then turned to the second
question: whether one of the statute's saving provisions applied to the
law.39 The court addressed only the local rights-of-way power preserved
by section 253(c) of the Act because the County did not contend that the
franchise law fell within the state's broad regulatory authority under
section 253(b) of the Act.4
After extensive analysis, the district court found that the franchise law
exceeded the County's legitimate rights-of-way authority under the
FTA. ' First, the court found that the law's application and approval
process unlawfully vested the County with complete discretion to
approve or deny a telecommunications company's franchise application
based on a "wide-ranging set of factors that ... relate to regulatory issues
that go well beyond the bounds of legitimate local governmental
monopolies in local telephone services and to benefit consumers by fostering competition
between telephone companies in cities throughout the United States"); Mills, supra note
31 ("The thrust of the bill is to sweep away regulatory barriers that for decades have
limited who competes in what business.").
34. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(a) (2001).
35. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(b) (2001) (entitled "State regulatory authority").
36. 47 U.S.C.A. § 253(c) (2001) (entitled "State and local government authority").
37. Bell Atl. Maryland, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 814-15.
38. Id. at 815.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 815 & n.23.
41. Id. at 815-20.
[Vol. 51:191
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regulation., 42  Second, the court found that the law's three percent
charge on a franchisee's gross revenues was not "reasonably calculated"
to reimburse the County for the actual cost of maintaining and improving
the public rights-of-way, but instead, improperly functioned as a general
revenue-raising measure.43  The district court concluded that the
franchise law "must be struck down on federal preemption grounds."
44
In basing its decision on preemption grounds, the district court expressly
avoided ruling on Bell Atlantic's constitutional claims because
consideration was "both unnecessary and improper., 45 The court also
declined to resolve the "complex and important" state law claims raised
in Bell Atlantic's lawsuit. 46 As the district court explained, regardless of
the outcome of the plaintiff's state law claims, "the ordinance still must
be struck down on the grounds that it fatally conflicts with the terms and
goals of the FTA.,
47
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the United States Court of AppealsS• 48
for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth
Circuit did not disapprove of the district court's decision on 
the merits.4 9
Rather, invoking the avoidance doctrine, the Fourth Circuit held that the
district court "committed reversible error" when it resolved the plaintiff's
42. Id. at 817.
43. Id. at 817-18. In addition, the district court disapproved of the County's decision
to impose its franchise requirement on telecommunications companies that used lines and
facilities owned, installed, and maintained by other companies. Id. at 819. The court
reasoned that the scope of local regulatory authority under the FTA did not extend to
companies or services that did not physically impact the public rights-of-way. Id. at 819-
20.
44. Id. at 821. The district court further determined that "given the number and
variety of provisions of the County's telecommunications franchise law that are preempted
by the FTA," it was not possible to sever the invalid provisions from the valid provisions.
Id.
45. Id. at 821 n.29.
46. Id. at 822. Bell Atlantic had argued that (1) P.G. County's franchise law was
preempted under state laws delegating to the Maryland Public Service Commission the
authority to determine which telecommunications companies were qualified to do business
in the state; (2) the law exceeded the scope of the County's powers under its charter; (3)
the law violated the terms of Bell Atlantic's perpetual, statewide franchise allegedly
granted by the Maryland legislature in 1884; and (4) the law violated the terms of Bell
Atlantic's perpetual local telephone services contract allegedly granted by the County in
1904. Id. at 821.
47. Id. at 822.
48. Bell Atd. Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 212 F.3d 863, 866 (4th Cir.
2000) (vacating and remanding). The panel consisted of United States Circuit Judges H.
Emory Widener and J. Michael Luttig and United States District Judge Joseph F.
Anderson (sitting by designation). Id. at 864. Judge Widener wrote the opinion for a
unanimous panel. Id.
49. See id. at 866 ("express[ing] no opinion" on the merits of the dispute).
2001]
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FTA preemption claim "in advance of considering the state law
questions upon which the case might have been disposed."50 According
to the Fourth Circuit, "determining whether a federal statute preempts a
state statute[] is a constitutional question."" Based on this assumption,
the court held that "[i]n deciding the constitutional question of
preemption rather than first considering the state law questions, the
district court violated the second and fourth rules of Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority.
52
The Fourth Circuit was referring to Justice Brandeis' famous
concurrence in Ashwander, in which he set forth seven basic principles
for the avoidance of constitutional questions.53 The second and fourth of
these principles are:
2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it ....
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question
although properly presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be
disposed of.:
4
In overturning the district court's decision in Bell Atlantic Maryland,
50. Id.
51. Id. at 865 (citing Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S.
311,317 (1981)).
52. Id.
53. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring). Justice Brandeis' seven Ashwander principles are:
(1) The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary, proceeding ....
(2) The Court will not "anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it ...."
(3) The Court will not "formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
(4) The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of ....
(5) The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation ....
(6) The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance
of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
(7) "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if
a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided."
Id. (footnotes and internal citations omitted). For a comprehensive discussion of Justice
Brandeis' Ashwander concurrence, see Kloppenberg, supra note 4, at 1012-27.
54. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-47 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
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the Fourth Circuit found that the district court violated these two
principles when it resolved the plaintiff's federal statutory preemption
claim before addressing the plaintiff's alternative state law claims.55 In
the Fourth Circuit's view, the district court should have exhausted all
potentially dispositive state law grounds for decision before deciding
whether the FTA preempted P.G. County's franchise law. As this
article explains, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Bell Atlantic Maryland was
erroneous because the avoidance doctrine does not apply to federal
preemption claims.
III. THE AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION CLAIMS
The avoidance doctrine may be defined as the jurisprudential principle
by which a "federal court should refuse to rule on a constitutional issue if
the case can be resolved on a nonconstitutional basis."57 The Supreme
Court's decision in Harmon v. Brucker 8 illustrates the typical application
of the avoidance doctrine. The issue in Harmon was whether two
military draftees could be issued less-than-honorable discharges based
upon their pre-induction conduct. 9 The particular pre-induction conduct
the draftees were charged with included participating in various
communist-controlled groups and activities."" The draftees' actual
military service, on the other hand, was considered "excellent."6 The
plaintiffs argued that, in setting their level of discharge, the Secretary of
the Army was not authorized by Congress to consider the plaintiffs' non-
military records. 6' The plaintiffs further argued that the Secretary's
decision to issue them less-than-honorable discharges violated their
rights to due process of law under the Fifth Amendment and to a judicial
trial under the Sixth Amendment.
63
Finding the issue presented to be "peculiarly military" in nature, the
55. Bell Atl. Maryland v. Prince George's County, 212 F.3d 863, 865-66 (4th Cir.
2000).
56. Id. at 865.
57. Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1004 (referring to the avoidance doctrine as the
"last resort rule").
58. 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam) (cited by the district court in Bell At. Maryland
v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 813 (D. Md. 1999), vacated 212 F.3d 863
(4th Cir. 2000)).
59. Id. at 580-81.
60. Harmon v. Brucker, 243 F.2d 613, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 579 (1958)
(per curiam). The plaintiffs denied being members of the Communist Party. Id. at 616-17.
61. Id. at 617.
62. Harmon, 355 U.S. at 580-81.
63. Id. at 581.
20011
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district court deferred to the Secretary's discretion and dismissed the
plaintiffs' lawsuit for lack of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals
affirmed.64 The plaintiffs then appealed their case to the Supreme Court,
which reversed. Applying the avoidance doctrine, the Court "look[ed]
first to petitioners' nonconstitutional claim that [the Secretary of the
Army] acted in excess of powers granted him by Congress., 66 The Court
made short shrift of the government's jurisdictional defense, asserting
that "judicial relief is available to one who has been injured by an act of a
government official which is in excess of his express or implied powers.,
67
The Court then addressed the merits of the plaintiffs' statutory claim,
agreeing with the plaintiffs that the statute governing military discharges
required the Secretary to base his discharge decisions solely on the
plaintiffs' military records."' The Court explicitly avoided the plaintiffs'
69constitutional arguments.
Harmon presented the Supreme Court with the jurisprudential choice
of deciding the case on statutory grounds or on constitutional grounds.7"
In this situation, the avoidance doctrine provides that a case should be
decided on statutory grounds.7 In Rescue Army v. Municipal Court,72 the
Supreme Court explained that the avoidance doctrine is rooted in the
separation of powers among the three branches of government and
embodies the Court's recognition of the "delicacy" and "comparative
finality" of its constitutional decision-making.73 In other words, through
the avoidance doctrine, the Court is acknowledging that a Constitution-
based decision is more prone to reflect a judge's personal and political
predilections than is a statute-based decision. 7' At the same time, a
64. Harmon v. Brucker, 137 F. Supp. 475, 477-78 (D.D.C. 1956), afj'd, 243 F.2d 613
(D.C. Cir. 1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 579 (1958) (per curiam).
65. Harmon, 355 U.S. at 579.
66. Id. at 581.
67. Id. at 581-82.
68. Id. at 583.
69. Id. at 581.
70. See id.
71. See, e.g., Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 (1982) ("Where a party raises both
statutory and constitutional arguments in support of a judgment, ordinarily we first
address the statutory argument in order to avoid unnecessary resolution of the
constitutional issue."); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that "if a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or
general law, the Court will decide only the latter").
72. 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
73. Id. at 571.
74. See U.S. CONST. art. V. Article Five provides, in relevant part:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
[Vol. 51:191
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Constitution-based decision cannot be rescinded by Congress, or the
American people, except through the difficult amendment process as the
second Justice Harlan once observed, "we possess this awesome power of
judicial review, this duty to bind coordinate branches of the federal
system with our view of what the Constitution dictates."75 Faced with the
responsibility of exercising this "awesome power," the Court has adopted
a policy of "judicial restraint" when confronted with constitutional
issues."
In Bell Atlantic Maryland, the district court explicitly applied this
policy of judicial restraint when it decided the case on federal
preemption grounds, rather than on the grounds that P.G. County's
Telecommunications Franchise Law violated the plaintiff's constitutional
rights.77 The Fourth Circuit held, however, that the district court
committed reversible because the plaintiff's FTA claim itself raised a
"constitutional question" within the meaning of the avoidance doctrine
that should not have been addressed until after all of the plaintiff's state
law claims had been resolved."'
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Bell Atlantic Maryland is
unprecedented. No other federal court has applied the avoidance
doctrine in the preemption context.79 The Fourth Circuit's decision is
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the
one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress ....
Id. More than 10,000 constitutional amendments have been proposed in Congress since
1791, but only twenty-seven have been adopted by the states. Robert Longley, Amending
the Constitution, at http://usgovinfo.miningco.com/library/blconstamend.htm (last visited
Aug. 29, 2001).
75. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 678 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring). For a
critical discussion of the judicial decision-making process, see, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The
Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIs. L. REV.
837 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Non-Legal Theory in Judicial Decisionmaking, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (1994).
76. It is beyond the scope of this article to evaluate the wisdom of this policy. For a
critical discussion of the avoidance doctrine, see, e.g., William K. Kelley, Avoiding
Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001);
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SuP. CT. REV. 71 (1996).
77. Bell Atl. Maryland v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 822 (D. Md.
1999), vacated, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000).
78. Bell Atd. Maryland v. Prince George's County, 212 F.3d 863, 865-66 (4th Cir.
2000).
79. The author's research revealed no other cases in which a federal court of appeals
reversed a district court's decision declaring a state or local statute preempted by federal
law on the grounds that the avoidance doctrine precluded the district court from
2001]
Catholic University Law Review
also wrong, since the avoidance doctrine does not apply to federal
preemption claims. None of the cases cited by the Fourth Circuit in its
opinion supports a contrary view. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit ignored
Supreme Court precedent directly on point that conclusively establishes
that federal preemption claims do not raise "constitutional questions" for
purposes of applying the avoidance doctrine. Rather, the Supreme Court
treats preemption claims like any other statutory cause of action for
which judicial deference to state law is not required.
A. Ashwander and Kalo Brick.
In support of its decision in Bell Atlantic Maryland, the Fourth Circuit
relied on two cases: Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority0 and
Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co."l
Neither of these cases holds that the avoidance doctrine applies to a
party's federal preemption claims; nor do they hold that all potentially
dispositive state law claims must be resolved before any federal
preemption claims may be addressed.
The issue in Ashwander was whether the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) exceeded the federal government's constitutional authority when
it entered into a contract with a local power company to purchase
property and transmission facilities owned by the company and to sell the
company surplus power generated by the TVA's hydroelectric power
plant located at the Wilson Dam.82 Justice Brandeis, joined by three
other Justices, argued that the constitutional question in Ashwander
should be avoided and that the case should be decided on the grounds
addressing the plaintiff's federal preemption claim until after it had resolved all of the
plaintiff's state law claims. See, e.g., Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 12 F. Supp. 2d 844 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (FAIR), affd in part & rev'd in part, 189 F.3d
633 (7th Cir. 1999); Gustafson v. Lake Angelus, 856 F. Supp. 320 (E.D. Mich. 1993), aftd
in part & rev'd in part, 76 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 1996). In FAIR and Gustafyon, the plaintiffs
contended, inter alia, that a city ordinance was preempted under both state and federal
law. FAIR, 189 F.3d at 634; Gustafson, 856 F. Supp. at 323. In each case, the district court
resolved the plaintiff's federal law preemption claim, but did not address the plaintiff's
state law preemption claim. FAIR, 12 F. Supp. 2d at 845; Gustafson, 856 F. Supp. at 326.
In neither case did the court of appeals suggest that the district court committed reversible
error when it failed to resolve the plaintiff's state law claim. Indeed, the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1967(c), expressly authorizes federal district courts
exercising original jurisdiction over a party's federal law claims to decline to rule upon
related state law claims joined to the party's action. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Int'l
College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997).
80. 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
81. 450 U.S. 311 (1981).
82. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 315-16, 326. The Wilson Dam is located on the Tennessee
River in northern Alabama. Id. at 315-16.
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that the plaintiffs, who were shareholders in the local power company,
lacked standing to maintain the suit.83 A majority of the Court disagreed
with Justice Brandeis' argument regarding the standing issue. 14 Reaching
the merits of the dispute, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
contract, a result which Justice Brandeis joined.85
Ashwander is plainly inapposite to the issues raised in Bell Atlantic
Maryland. In addition to the fact that Ashwander did not involve a
federal preemption question, the Supreme Court's decision in
Ashwander did not turn on the application of Justice Brandeis' seven
avoidance principles. Indeed, the Court squarely addressed the
constitutional issues presented in the case. 86  Certainly, neither the
majority opinion nor Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Ashwander stands
for the proposition that a federal preemption claim raises a
"constitutional question" within the meaning of the avoidance doctrine,
or that a plaintiff's federal preemption challenge to a state or local
ordinance must be deferred until all possible state law grounds for
decision have been resolved.
Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co.7
likewise did not hold that the avoidance doctrine applies to federal
preemption claims, or that a party's state law claims must be fully
resolved before any federal preemption claims may be considered by the
court. In fact, in Kalo Brick, the Supreme Court reached the merits of
the federal preemption issue presented in the case, despite the
83. Id. at 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring). Justices Stone, Roberts, and Cardozo joined
Justice Brandeis' concurrence. Id. at 356. Justice Brandeis' standing argument was not
based on the plaintiffs' presumed lack of injury, but on the fact that under Alabama law,
stockholders had no right to interfere with the business activities of a corporation. Id. at
341-43 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
84. Id. at 323. Chief Justice Hughes, writing for three other Justices, found that the
plaintiffs "have made a sufficient showing to entitle them to bring suit and that a
constitutional question is properly presented and should be decided." Id. Justice
McReynolds, the lone dissenter, agreed that the plaintiffs "have presented a justiciable
controversy which we must decide." Id. at 356 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 341 (Brandeis, J., concurring). In upholding the constitutionality of the
contract, the Court first found that the federal government possessed the constitutional
authority to construct both the Wilson Dam and the dam's hydroelectric power plant. Id.
at 330. The Court then found that the electricity generated by the power plant constituted
federal property that the government could dispose of pursuant to Article IV, section 3 of
the Constitution. Id. Finally, the Court found that the TVA's purchase of the property
and transmission lines from the local power company and its sale to the company of
surplus power were "appropriate means of disposition" for the electricity it generated. Id.
at 338.
86. Id. at 326-40.
87. 450 U.S. 311 (1981).
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availability of a potentially dispositive state law basis for decision."'
The plaintiff in Kalo Brick was a brick manufacturer located near
Kalo, Iowa. 9 A railroad branch line operated by the Chicago and
Northwestern Transportation Company (C&N) serviced the plaintiff's
plant.90 Following the destruction of the branch line in 1967 by a
mudslide, C&N leased part of a parallel branch line to connect the
plaintiff's plant to market.9' When, a few years later, the leased line was
also damaged by a mudslide, C&N decided not to repair it and informed
the plaintiff that rail service would no longer be available to or from the
plaintiff's plant.92 C&N subsequently filed an application with the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity permitting it to abandon the line.93
While C&N's abandonment application was pending before the ICC,
the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Iowa state court seeking damages from the
railroad under Iowa law for C&N's decision to discontinue rail service on
the branch line.94 The plaintiff asserted causes of action for state
statutory violations, common law negligence, and tortious interference
with the plaintiff's business relations.9 Without reaching the merits of
the plaintiff's state law claims-an adverse ruling on which could have
ended the case-the trial court dismissed the lawsuit on the grounds that
the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) "wholly pre-empted state law as to
the matters in contention., 96  The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed,
finding that the ICA did not preempt state law, which, according to the
appellate court, provided a "complimentary [sic], alternative means of
relief for injured parties."97 After the Iowa Supreme Court declined the
railroad's application for review, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide whether the plaintiff's state law claims were
88. Id. at 323-27.
89. Id. at 313. Kalo is located approximately sixty-five miles northwest of Des
Moines. Bali Online, Distance Result, at http://www.indo.com/cgi-bin/
dist?placel=kalo%2C+iowa&place2=des+moines%2Ciowa (last visited Sept. 27, 2001).
90. Kalo Brick, 450 U.S. at 313.
91. Id. at 314.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 315.
95. Id. The plaintiff's principal cause of action arose under Iowa Code Ann. §§ 479.3
and 479.122 (1971), which together "create[d] a state-court damages action for failure to
provide proper [rail] service." Id. at 315 n.5.
96. Id. at 315-16.
97. Id. at 316 (quoting Kalo Brick & Tile Co. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 295
N.W.2d 467,469 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 311 (1981)).
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preempted by the ICA.98
The Court began its analysis by acknowledging that federal
preemption of state law "is not favored."99 Nevertheless, the Court
explained that "when Congress has chosen to legislate pursuant to its
constitutional powers, then a court must find local law pre-empted by
federal regulation whenever the challenged state statute stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."' ° In Kalo Brick, the Court found that through
the ICA, "Congress granted to the [Interstate Commerce] Commission
plenary authority to regulate ... rail carriers' cessations of service on
their lines."' 0' The Court further found that "at least as to
abandonments, this authority is exclusive."' 0 2
The Iowa appellate court had found, however, that under Iowa law, a
railroad could be held liable for failing to provide rail service despite the
ICC's approval of the abandonment. 3 Confronted with this conflict
between federal and state law, the Court held that the plaintiff's state law
causes of action were preempted by the ICA.'04 Contrary to the Fourth
Circuit's approach in Bell Atlantic Maryland, the Court in Kalo Brick did
not hold that the conflict should be avoided by first addressing the
plaintiff's state law claims to determine if they were viable.
The Fourth Circuit cited Kalo Brick for a single passage in which the
Supreme Court describes federal preemption analysis as involving
"essentially a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of
the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question of
whether they are in conflict."'0 5 It was from this passage that the Fourth
Circuit erroneously concluded that Bell Atlantic's FTA preemption
claim raised a "constitutional question" within the meaning of the
avoidance doctrine.' °6 This passage from Kalo Brick, however, simply
acknowledges that federal preemption claims ultimately depend upon
the Supremacy Clause for their force.'0 7 The passage does not address
the jurisprudential point for which it was cited by the Fourth Circuit,
namely, that federal preemption claims are subject to the avoidance
98. Id. at 313, 317.
99. Id. at 317.
100. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
101. Id. at 323.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 323-24.
104. Id. at 327.
105. Bell At. Maryland, 212 F.3d at 865-66 (quoting Kalo Brick, 450 U.S at 317).
106. Id. at 865.
107. Id.
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doctrine.08
Indeed, the Supreme Court's holding in Kalo Brick does not support
the Fourth Circuit's position. Despite the presence of a potentially
dispositive state law question-i.e., whether the plaintiff's state law
claims had merit, a negative answer to which could have ended the
case-the Supreme Court resolved the case on federal preemption
grounds.' 9 Under the Fourth Circuit's literal reading of Justice Brandeis'
avoidance principles, however, the Supreme Court should not have ruled
upon the ICA preemption issue in Kalo Brick until after the plaintiff's
various state law claims had been resolved. The Court could have
avoided the federal preemption claim had the plaintiff's state law claims
been rejected on the merits. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reached
the preemption issue and decided the case on federal law grounds." ° The
Supreme Court's decision in Kalo Brick thus offers no support for the
Fourth Circuit's application of the avoidance doctrine in Bell Atlantic
Maryland.
B. Douglas and Blum
The Fourth Circuit's misguided reliance on the Kalo Brick passage
quoted above blinded it to the existence of other Supreme Court cases in
which the Court expressly states that federal preemption claims are to be
treated as statutory claims, not constitutional claims, for purposes of
applying the avoidance doctrine. The two leading cases are Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc.,"' which the Supreme Court decided four years
before Kalo Brick, and Blum v. Bacon,"2 which the Court decided a year
after Kalo Brick.
In Douglas, the plaintiff challenged two Virginia statutes that
purported to limit the rights of nonresidents and aliens to catch fish in
Virginia's territorial waters."3 The plaintiff, a British-owned commercial
fishing company that did not operate any processing plants in Virginia,
sued the state in federal district court seeking to have the statutes
enjoined on the grounds that they were preempted by federal fishing
108. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 107 (1989) (finding
that the Supremacy Clause is not a source of substantive rights; it simply serves as a
trumping principle that enforces existing federal rights whenever there is a conflict with
state or local law).
109. Kalo Brick, 450 U.S. at 331-32.
110. Id.
111. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
112. 457 U.S. 132 (1982).
113. Douglas, 431 U.S. at 267.
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laws." 4 The plaintiff also claimed that the statutes violated both the
Commerce Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."5 After a three-judge district court panel ruled in the
plaintiff's favor, the state appealed the case directly to the Supreme
Court, which affirmed."6 The Court held that the two Virginia statutes
"must fall under the Supremacy Clause" because the laws violated the
plaintiff's rights under federal law to engage in fishing activities on the
same terms as Virginia residents."7
In basing its decision on federal preemption grounds, the Douglas
Court expressly declined to "reach the constitutional issues raised by the
parties.""..8 With respect to the "constitutional" status of the preemption
claim itself, the Court explained that "[a]lthough the claim is basically
constitutional in nature, deriving its force from the operation of the
Supremacy Clause, it is treated as 'statutory' for purposes of our practice
of deciding statutory claims first to avoid unnecessary constitutional
adjudications."" 9 The Douglas Court thus drew a clear distinction
between substantive constitutional claims-such as the plaintiff's
Commerce Clause and equal protection claims-and statute-based
preemption claims.""
The Douglas Court further noted that, despite their ultimate source in
the Supremacy Clause, federal preemption claims are "of course,
statutory in the sense that [they] depend[] on interpretation of an Act of
Congress, and like any other statutory decision,... [they are] subject to
114. Id. at 271.
115. Id. at 271 & n.5.
116. Id. at 270-71.
117. Id. at 283, 286-87. The federal statute that preempted the Virginia fishing laws
was the Enrollment and Licensing Act, 46 U.S.C. § 12 (repealed). Id. at 286.
118. Id. at 272.
119. Id. at 271-72 (internal citation omitted). See also City of Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 430 U.S. 141, 142 (1977) (per curiam). In City of Philadelphia, the Court stated:
While federal pre-emption of state statutes is, of course, ultimately a question
under the Supremacy Clause, analysis of pre-emption issues depends primarily
on statutory and not constitutional interpretation. Therefore, it is appropriate
that the federal pre-emption issue be resolved before the constitutional issue of
alleged discrimination against or undue burden on interstate commerce is
addressed.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
120. S. Candice Hoke, Transcending Conventional Supremacy: A Reconstruction of the
Supremacy Clause, 24 CONN. L. REV. 829, 886-87 (1992) (explaining that substantive
constitutional claims "require a court to construe and apply a substantive heading of the
federal Constitution," whereas federal preemptions claims arise under specific federal
laws and require a court "to determine whether a state law provision is contrary to, or in
conflict with, federal law") (footnotes omitted).
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legislative overruling.",121 In other words, preemption claims are not
subject to the avoidance doctrine because they do not raise the same
concerns as substantive constitutional claims about the "delicacy" and
"comparative finality" of judicial decision-making.22
The Supreme Court drew the same distinction between substantive
constitutional claims and statutory preemption claims in Blum v.
Bacon. 2 In Blum, the plaintiffs bought a class action lawsuit in federal
district court challenging the validity of a New York statute that
prohibited recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), a federal welfare program, from participating in the state's
emergency assistance program.124 The plaintiffs argued that the state law
conflicted with federal regulations that required the inclusion of AFDC
recipients in any state emergency assistance program, like New York's
program, that received federal funding.12  The plaintiffs additionally
argued that the law violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, by singling out AFDC recipients for adverse
treatment. 126 The district court rejected the plaintiffs' preemption claim,
but held part of the law unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.'27
On appeal, the Second Circuit declared the entire law unconstitutional.
1 2
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling in Blum, but
on statutory grounds, not constitutional grounds. 29 The Court began its
analysis by reiterating the basic avoidance doctrine principle: "Where a
party raises both statutory and constitutional arguments in support of a
judgment, ordinarily we first address the statutory argument in order to
avoid unnecessary resolution of the constitutional issue."'3 Finding that
"this case may be resolved on statutory grounds," the Court held that the
New York statute conflicted with federal regulations proscribing
inequitable treatment in a state's emergency assistance program and,
consequently, was "invalid under the Supremacy Clause."'3 The Court
declined to address the plaintiffs' equal protection argument.
32
121. Douglas, 431 U.S. at 272 n.6.
122. See Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
123. 457 U.S. 132, 137-38 (1982).
124. Id. at 133.
125. Id. at 135, 138, 140.
126. Id. at 135.
127. Id. at 137.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 137-38.
130. Id. at 137.
131. Id. at 137-38, 141,145-46.
132. Id. at 146.
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In both Douglas and Blum, the Supreme Court explicitly differentiated
between substantive constitutional claims and statutory preemption
claims when applying the avoidance doctrine. Contrary to the Fourth
Circuit's assumption in Bell Atlantic Maryland, federal preemption
claims thus do not raise constitutional questions within the meaning of
the avoidance doctrine. The avoidance doctrine, therefore, did not
apply to the plaintiff's claim that P.G. County's telecommunications
ordinance violated the FTA, and the district court did not commit
reversible error when it resolved the plaintiff's federal preemption claim
without first addressing the plaintiff's alternative state law claims.
C. Swift & Co. v. Wickham
Additional support for the distinction between substantive
constitutional claims and statutory preemption claims is found in the
Supreme Court's opinion in Swift & Co. v. Wickham,'33 which involved a
similar analytical issue.
The issue in Swift was whether a three-judge district court panel was
required to be convened under § 2281 of Title 28 in the U.S. Code, which
formerly provided for a three-judge tribunal whenever a plaintiff sought
to enjoin a state law "upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of the
statute."'34 The plaintiffs in Swift were two frozen turkey manufacturers
who filed suit in federal district court in New York seeking to enjoin
certain state-mandated food labeling requirements.'35 The plaintiffs
argued that the labeling requirements violated the Commerce Clause and
the Fourteenth Amendment and were also preempted by the federal
Poultry Products Inspection Act of 1957."' The plaintiffs requested a
three-judge district court panel pursuant to § 2281 . The district court,
unsure of its jurisdiction, dismissed the lawsuit acting in both a single-
judge and three-judge capacity. The plaintiffs then appealed the
district court's single-judge ruling to the Second Circuit, and the district
court's three-judge ruling to the Supreme Court.3 9
In Swift, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the
plaintiffs' Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment claims were
133. 382 U.S. 111 (1965).
134. Id. at 114.
135. Id. at 113-14.
136. Id. at 112, 114.
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"too insubstantial to support the jurisdiction of a three-judge court."' 4
This meant that unless the plaintiffs' preemption claim raised a
constitutional challenge within the meaning of § 2281, the Court would
be without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.1 4' The Court concluded that §
2281 did not apply in the circumstances presented in Swift. 42 The Court
reasoned that, although preemption claims are "of course grounded in
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution," the "basic question"
involved in such cases "is never one of interpretation of the Federal
Constitution but inevitably one of comparing two statutes. 1 43 The Court
further reasoned that, in contrast to substantive constitutional claims,
preemption claims "involve[] more confining legal analysis and can
hardly be thought to raise the worrisome possibilities that economic or
political predilections will find their way into a judgment.'
44
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
145
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Clark, vigorously
dissented in Swift, arguing that there was "no difference between a
charge of 'unconstitutionality' of a state statute whether the conflict be
between it and the Constitution or between it and a federal law.'
46
Justice Douglas' view, which is essentially the Fourth Circuit's view in
Bell Atlantic Maryland, was squarely rejected by the Court. 1
4
The three-judge statute (now repealed), analyzed in Swift and the
avoidance doctrine analyzed in Douglas and Blum share a common
purpose: to prevent unnecessary constitutional decision-making.1 48 This
shared purpose is driven by the same underlying concern, namely,that
the personal and political beliefs of individual judges will influence their
interpretation of what the Constitution's broadly worded provisions
require. 49 As the Supreme Court explained in Douglas, Blum, and Swift,
however, this concern is not implicated in federal preemption cases
140. Id. at 115.
141. Seeid. at 114.
142. Id. at 128-29.
143. Id. at 120.
144. Id. at 127.
145. Id. at 129.
146. Id. at 131 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 127.
148. Id. See also Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 132, 137 (1982); Douglas v. Seacoast, 431
U.S. 265, 272 (1977). As the Supreme Court explained in Swift, the three-judge statute
originally was enacted to restrain federal district courts from invalidating state laws on
substantive due process grounds, by "[r]equiring the collective judgment of three judges
and accelerating appeals to [the Supreme] Court." Swift, 382 U.S. at 127.
149. See Swift, 382 U.S. at 127.
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because statutory interpretation is not as subjective as constitutional
interpretation, and unlike Constitution-based decisions, statute-based
decisions are readily subject to legislative overruling. Consequently, the
Court's holding in Swift that federal preemption claims do not raise
constitutional challenges within the meaning of § 2281 directly supports
its conclusion in Douglas and Blum that federal preemption claims do
not raise constitutional questions within the meaning of the avoidance
doctrine.5
IV. TURNING THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE ON ITS HEAD
The Supremacy Clause provides that "the Laws of the United
States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;... any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.' '51
The seminal case regarding the Supremacy Clause is Gibbons v. Ogden.'52
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall delivered the still-definitive
interpretation of the Supremacy Clause.'53 The issue in Gibbons was
whether the state of New York could bar a federally licensed steamboat
operator (Gibbons) from operating in New York's territorial waters
based on the state's earlier decision to grant a monopoly on the trade to
another steamboat operator (Ogden). 5" After first determining that
Congress's interstate commerce power extended to the matter in
dispute,' and that New York possessed the concurrent power to
regulate its internal economy, 5" Chief Justice Marshall turned to the
ultimate question in the case: what happens when a state law "come[s]
into collision with an act of Congress"?' 57 In that situation, Chief Justice
Marshall declared, the state law "must yield to the law of Congress."'58
150. See also Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 614 F.2d 206, 209-11
(9th Cir. 1980) (holding that federal preemption claims do not raise constitutional
questions for purposes of depriving federal district courts of jurisdiction under Johnson
Act over challenges to local utility rates); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Utils. Comm'n, 713
F.2d 1024, 1027-28 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Comm'n,
676 F.2d 374, 377-78 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that federal preemption claims do not raise
constitutional questions for purposes of requiring federal district courts to abstain under
the Pullman doctrine); Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd. v. Empie, 778 F.2d 1447, 1451 & n.4
(10th Cir. 1985) (same) (citing cases).
151. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
152. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
153. Id. at 184.
154. Id. at 2-3.
155. Id. at 197.
156. Id. at 209-10.
157. Id. at 210.
158. Id.
2001]
Catholic University Law Review
In Gibbons, Chief Justice Marshall explained that when a state law
conflicts with a federal law, it is "immaterial" whether the state law was
validly enacted pursuant to the state's own powers.5 9 Through the
Supremacy Clause, the "act of Congress... is supreme," and the state
law becomes a "nullity."' 6  Thus, as a constitutional matter, the
Supremacy Clause invalidates any state or local law that conflicts with a
federal statute.'' Courts confronted with federal preemption claims,
therefore, are required to determine whether the federal and state laws
conflict and, if they do, to declare the state laws preempted. 62 As the
Supreme Court explained in Kalo Brick, "when Congress has chosen to
legislate pursuant to its constitutional powers, then a court must find
local law preempted by federal regulation whenever the challenged state
statute stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 63 In such a situation, federal
preemption of state law "is compelled."' '6 Only if the state or local law
survives the preemption analysis should the court address any state law
claims.
65
Accordingly, determining whether a federal statute preempts state or
local law is a mandatory, not discretionary, judicial exercise. 66 Contrary
159. Id.
160. ld. at 210-11.
161. Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 3 (1986) (per curiam) ("There can be
no dispute that the Supremacy Clause invalidates all state laws that conflict or interfere
with an Act of Congress.").
162. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311,317 (1981).
163. Id. at 317 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
164. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); see also Gade v. Nat'l
Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality opinion) (quoting Jones);
Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union, 468 U.S. 491, 503 (1984)
("If the state law regulates conduct that is actually protected by federal law... pre-
emption follows... as a matter of substantive right. Where, as here, the issue is one of an
asserted substantive conflict with a federal enactment .... the Framers of our Constitution
provided that the federal law must prevail.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. Kalo Brick, 450 U.S. at 317.
166. In sharp contrast, the avoidance doctrine is only a "prudential rule" that is
applied on a case-by-case basis. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 7-8
(1993); see also Rescue Army v. Mun. Court, 331 U.S. 549, 574 (1947) (explaining that "the
policy's applicability can be determined only by an exercise of judgment relative to the
particular presentation"). "The fact that there may be buried in the record a
nonconstitutional ground for decision is not by itself enough to invoke this rule." Zobrest,
509 U.S. at 8. Compare, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (holding that Georgia
statute requiring drug testing of candidates for state political office violated candidates'
rights under Fourth Amendment; neither the Supreme Court nor the court of appeals
addressed the candidates' alternative argument that the statute violated their rights under
Georgia's Constitution). For an analysis of the avoidance doctrine issue presented in
Zobrest, see Kloppenberg, supra note 3, at 1006-11.
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to the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Bell Atlantic Maryland, it would have
been improper for the district court in that case to disregard the express
preemption clause contained in the FTA. Through the FTA, Congress
has declared national policy in the telecommunications arena. It was the
district court's obligation to apply and enforce that policy in the face of a
potentially conflicting local ordinance. Whether P.G. County's
Telecommunications Franchise Law could have been invalidated under
state law was therefore wholly "immaterial" to the preemption analysis.
Indeed, as the district court recognized, even if the ordinance had passed
muster under state law, it still would have been preempted under federal
law. 167
Gibbons clearly establishes that the supremacy of federal law is not
merely a background or last resort principle.1 6 ' Rather, it is the
fundamental premise of our constitutional structure. Through the
Supremacy Clause, all state and local laws that conflict with a duly
authorized federal statute are rendered void ab initio.169  The Fourth
Circuit's decision in Bell Atlantic Maryland thus turns the Supremacy
Clause on its head because it makes a party's federal preemption claim
secondary to, and contingent upon, the outcome of any state law claims
joined to the party's action. Whatever anti-nationalist impulses may
have motivated the Fourth Circuit in this case, its decision is contrary to
Supreme Court precedent and unfaithful to the Constitution itself.
V. CONCLUSION
In Bell Atlantic Maryland, the Fourth Circuit held that the district
court committed reversible error when it invalidated a local
telecommunications ordinance on federal preemption grounds without
first determining whether the ordinance was valid under state law. The
Fourth Circuit's ruling was based on an erroneous interpretation of the
avoidance doctrine, which provides that federal courts should avoid
deciding cases on constitutional grounds when a non-constitutional basis
167. Bell Atd. Maryland v. Prince George's County, 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 822 (D. Md.
1999) (noting that state law questions need not be resolved because the ordinance is
preempted by federal law); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text. Consequently,
the state law decisions rendered by the district court on remand are improper advisory
opinions, since the outcome of the case will necessarily remain unchanged. See Bell AtL
Maryland v. Prince George's County, 155 F. Supp. 2d 465 (D. Md. 2001) (finding P.G.
County's Telecommunications Franchise law preempted under state law). Moreover,
requiring the district court to engage in such a pointless state law exercise represents an
extremely poor use of judicial resources.
168. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210-11 (1824).
169. Id.
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for decision is available. The Fourth Circuit wrongly assumed that the
avoidance doctrine applies to statutory preemption claims. In a series of
cases completely overlooked by the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court
has made clear that the avoidance doctrine does not apply to federal
preemption claims. The doctrine only applies to claims rooted in one of
the Constitution's substantive provisions. Moreover, under the
preemption doctrine, courts are required to invalidate state or local laws
that conflict with a federal statute. There simply is no support in the case
law for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bell Atlantic Maryland to require
district courts to defer ruling on federal preemption claims until after all
potentially dispositive state law claims have been resolved. 70
170. The case has already established a precedent that other Fourth Circuit panels
must follow. See, e.g., MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 361 (4th
Cir. 2001). The Fourth Circuit should vacate the Bell Atlantic Maryland decision en banc.
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